Beffroi Demo https://op.spk.li

Forge a client

One provider, one identity, and as many clients as there are ways of asking. Every choice below is read from the document https://op.spk.li publishes: what it does not announce is not offered here. The client is registered the moment you build it (RFC 7591), signs the user in, and deletes itself when you are done with it (RFC 7592).

Presets

21 compositions written down. A preset fills the form below, and building it replaces the client of the same name.

Code + PKCE

Signs in with a code and PKCE S256; its secret travels in a header.

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Posted response

Gets the code in a POST rather than in the URL, and its secret in the body.

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Private key

Signs an assertion with its own key: no shared secret.

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Authorization details

Asks to pay one invoice up to 45 EUR, rather than for a scope.

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FAPI 2.0 with DPoP

Pushes a signed request, reads a signed response, holds a token bound to its key.

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FAPI 2.0 with mTLS

The same profile, proven by the certificate of the connection.

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Pairwise subject

Sees the user under an identifier no other client sees.

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Public client

Holds no secret at all: PKCE alone ties the code to it.

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Signed response

Gets the answer as a JWT it verifies (JARM).

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Pushed request

Pushes its request first; the browser carries only a reference (PAR).

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Signed request

Sends its request signed with its own key (JAR).

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Secret-signed assertion

Signs an assertion with its secret instead of sending the secret.

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PKI certificate

Proves who it is with a certificate an authority issued (mTLS).

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Self-signed certificate

Proves who it is with a certificate it published itself (mTLS).

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Bound to a key

Holds a token useless without its key: every call carries a proof (DPoP).

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Bound to a certificate

Holds a token useless without its certificate.

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Refresh token

Asks for offline_access and gets a refresh token.

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Encrypted ID token

Gets an ID token only its own key can open.

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Signed, encrypted UserInfo

Gets UserInfo as a JWT, signed by the provider and encrypted to it.

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Front-channel logout

Is told of a logout in the browser, by a frame the provider loads.

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Back-channel logout

Is told of a logout server to server, by a signed logout token.

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Clients this browser has built

fapi JC6zyTTaIc69lswo6_sNt0-6KnPCsl1eE-N8xONuERI · Forged: FAPI 2.0 with DPoP
Take it apart
backchannel P20lndlnw4sW5iSBvhQHP2uuUT7-jQx4lbAn16UiTxc · Forged: back-channel logout
Take it apart
frontchannel NAmAwOaXvi7BPoZXXbx09-9ej71x0YHLIMgdhPOegQ4 · Forged: front-channel logout
Take it apart
userinfo-jwt XzyPyIK32ONlQkm8Fv7GC7PA87lf2fJKq9Y5fM1mLro · Forged: a signed and encrypted UserInfo
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encrypted-id-token tQh16ErY5-9N1n3PUhTKJ0g9TNb3U_zFxBkYylsjAYw · Forged: an encrypted ID token
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refresh 1i1uYjY5yH8ciz_2xd9KzhvvsN_vAtA4rRncXqeeqDI · Forged: a refresh token
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dpop WOucwsOo8yEHKsiX3usztRdEspfMJUxzLNvpm_-uGIg · Forged: a token bound to a key
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key kD5Xt1PDHk7r5Z309eWtxrpkpVTD5gCTspEJBL0tFZs · Forged: a key instead of a secret
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secret-jwt m6iSGGFmqucf3h0Ytgwp8I8JUBgSpc9LDq7heOmV4gE · Forged: an assertion signed with the secret
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public cgFnUuTT1ggW9JNe6mUBJtL-ANzWRoOVkZKCexvn0_w · Forged: no credential at all
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pairwise OUixtNBCcxtEt7JwmgxxA6r2utQoYoKX3tCG4Flke1c · Forged: a sub of its own
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jar LkMH6kCbqJFqySNMaxx-tf4vbTo9eTTnSiErzax7RYo · Forged: a signed request
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par 2M24n76rBK3ocDMySv5ZxwSW8r3C-o9gWDDO8yC4N5c · Forged: a pushed request
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jarm qc42001zD4B9M9Pzn82pbHx8LYuOxWPRBQYDF4Otpr0 · Forged: a signed response
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form-post T1romGtRWjEm4sEHAvGY1DmQy8dd16qr24NuGUpmPeg · Forged: a posted response
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basic BX_fadezT6U8dxyQ7n20edeSPJiKEjHYTCF7gZ3adPs · Forged: everything in the open
Take it apart

Compose one

Filled with the preset rar. What is submitted is this form, so anything below can be changed before it is built; it will then be built under a handle of its own and leave the preset where it is.

What it is
What it asks for
scope openid is in every composition, this being a client that signs a user in.
How it proves it is itself

client_secret_basic — client_secret_basic: the identifier and the secret in the Authorization header (RFC 6749 §2.3.1)

client_secret_post — client_secret_post: the identifier and the secret in the body of the request (RFC 6749 §2.3.1)

private_key_jwt — private_key_jwt: an assertion signed with the key this client published, and no secret anywhere (RFC 7523 §2.2)

client_secret_jwt — client_secret_jwt: an assertion signed with HS256 over the shared secret, which never travels (RFC 7523 §2.2)

none — none: a public client, which holds no credential and is tied to its request by PKCE S256 alone (RFC 7636)

How the request travels

query — query: code, state and iss in the URL of the redirection (RFC 9207 for the issuer)

form_post — form_post: a self-submitting page posts the answer back, nothing of it in the URL (Form Post Response Mode §2)

query.jwt — query.jwt: one signed "response" parameter in the URL, which the client verifies before reading it (JARM §4.1)

form_post.jwt — form_post.jwt: one signed "response" field, posted back by a page of the provider (JARM §4.1)

jwt — query.jwt: one signed "response" parameter in the URL, which the client verifies before reading it (JARM §4.1)

What comes back
What it receives, and how it holds it

none — none: a bearer token, which whoever holds it can spend (RFC 6750 §1.2)

dpop — dpop: a key drawn for this login, proved on every request, which the provider names in "cnf.jkt" (RFC 9449)

What a logout reaches

What a client cannot ask for

Seven members of this provider are not offered above, and that is the rule and not an omission: they are written by whoever declares a client in the configuration, or by the registration policy of the tenant, and a client that registers itself is refused rather than obeyed. A client that comes from nowhere gets nothing a declared client does not get by asking for it (decision 0009).

access_token_formatthe shape of the access token, self-contained or opaque
resourcesthe resources it may ask a token for (RFC 8707 §2); a client that registers none asks for none
require_sender_constrained_tokensthat its tokens are never bearer tokens (FAPI 2.0 §5.3.1)
requires_consentthat the consent page may be skipped for it
requires_pkcethat PKCE may be dispensed with (decision 0017)
token_exchangewhat it may exchange a token for (RFC 8693 §2.1)
may_actwho may act for the subject of its tokens (RFC 8693 §4.4)

So the shape of the access token is the tenant's, and the page of a built client reads it off the token it was issued rather than off what it asked for. The two shapes are seen on the clients the configuration declares, which castor demo --resource-server signs in as.

What has no browser

Some flows of the provider are never clicked, because no browser of this application goes into them: the client is a program, or it is the provider that calls the client back. They are played from the command line of the provider's repository, castor demo --device, --ciba, --service, --assertion, --native and --push, and each one asserts every step. The forge composes a client of the authorization code grant, which is the one a browser plays.